Protest of June 17th game formally denied

As expected, Fredi Gonzalez's formal protest of the Atlanta Braves 6-2 loss to the Texas Rangers on June 17th has been formally denied.

The protest was based around two plays, one coming in the 5th inning and one coming in the 9th inning. Gonzalez was also said to have protested the batting order the Rangers sent out as well.

First, in the fifth inning, with Elvis Andrus on 2nd and nobody out, Josh Hamilton did not bunt. Fredi immediately protested the play from the dugout, yelling at home plate umpire Larry Vanover "Larry, you know as well as I do he has to bunt the runner over there." Making matters worse Hamilton then singled Andrus in, which enraged Fredi even more. Asked about the play after the game, Gonzalez said "well, it was clearly illegal, we know that with a man on 2nd and no outs you have to move the runner over. I know those guys are used to playing in the American League, and maybe their rules are different, but that's not how the game works here, this is a National League Park, am I right? I was about to take my normal 5th inning nap and just barely caught it, but boy was I angry."

Later in the ninth inning the Rangers held a 4 run lead to open the frame. At that point the Rangers brought in Neftali Feliz. At that juncture Fredi is said to have gone ballistic and was nearly thrown out of the game for yelling expletives at both the Rangers and umpires. Gonzalez said later "At that point they had to be just taunting the rule book, in my years of baseball, I've never seen such clear disregard for the game. I read an article on Bleacher Report saying that Feliz was their closer. That was clearly not a save situation, I know the math on that can be hard, but I asked like 5 people in the first row, just to be sure, and they all said it wasn't a save situation. And after the game the little "S" didn't show up next to Feliz's name, so I know it wasn't. Just a blatant disregard of the rules of the game."

Finally, as the Braves skipper was looking up at the scoreboard to see if the little "S" would pop up next to Feliz's name, he noticed something fishy. From watching some of the game he had clearly seen that Elvis Andrus was faster than Ian Kinsler. Yet Kinsler batted leadoff while Andrus batted in the second spot. "That was the last straw there" the manager said "I mean are they trying to deny that Andrus is the faster of those two players? They were definitely trying to pull a fast one over us, but luckily I caught it at the end of the game." Fredi continued "I know these protests don't go anywhere most of the time, I protested a game last year where the opposition batted a third baseman second, and that was denied. But this was three terrible, blatant instances of a complete disregard for the rule book. They can't just let this go unpunished."

When the letter finally arrived announcing that the Braves' petition had been denied the manager and coaches were engaged in a friendly game of "guess whose OBP is higher" where nobody had gotten the correct answer in 6 rounds, since Terry Pendleton correctly guessed that Brian McCann's OBP was higher than Tim Hudson's, though Fredi said "man, it seems like it feels like a lot closer than the numbers say." The coaches seemed unsurprised at the result of the letter, most admitting to not remembering the game at all anyway. Pitching coach Roger McDowell noting "hell, I've probably drank 36 handles of Jim Beam since then and beat up four gays, how the hell am I supposed to remember that kind of shit?"

Fredi read the letter aloud: "Attention Atlanta Braves Organization, your petition of the June 17th Game versus the Texas Rangers has been formally denied. Are you trying to troll us with this crap?"

Breaking Down Beltran, Pence, Heyward to the Minors, Upton, etc

I said yesterday that Beltran to the Braves just wasn't going to happen. Who knows how close it ever came and if there ever was a chance, but I get the distinct impression that as soon as both the Rangers and Giants were involved, the Braves were essentially out.

The analysis of the trade in the blogosphere seemed to begin with what teams could offer the Mets. However, I think an underappreciated angle was how much influence Beltran and Boras had over the process.

Beltran had indicated only really three things: 1) that he wanted to play for a contender (duh, who else would trade for him anyway?) 2) That he would prefer to play RF and 3) that he wanted to play everyday.

The problem with the Braves is that they seemingly couldn't really guarantee parts 2 and 3. In an interview with David O'Brien yesterday, Boras sounded for all the world like the Braves weren't even really a consideration. If the team wasn't giving up Minor, that wouldn't make Boras talk that way, Boras doesn't care who the Mets got, as long as it was enough to get his client moved. No, it's my opinion that once The Rangers and the Giants, both contenders who could gurantee Beltran an everyday spot in RF, got involved Beltran indicated he'd probably veto any trade to the Braves, who could only guarantee an everyday spot if Beltran would play CF at least part time. I actually doubt that once those two clubs were involved, the Braves actually had much of a chance to not offer Mike Minor. Once Boras saw that there were two clubs willing to offer a package that the Mets would accept, he essentially represented his client's wishes by indicating that the club that couldn't offer an everyday spot in RF was done. Classic game theory. Of course it's just speculation and we can never know for certain, but I think it's plausible if not probable.

Now, what of this Hunter Pence posturing? Dufus extraordinaire, Jim Bowden, of ESPN has said (along with other reports) that the Braves are heavily in on Hunter Pence. He also indicated (again, aping other reports) the Braves would option Heyward to the minors in order to open up a slot for Pence. If they are willing to do this, why wouldn't they give up Minor for Beltran and say we'll option Heyward to the minors?

It's my belief that this is either completely fabricated by bored beat writers (mostly Mark Bowman, who seemed to completely pull the original Heyward to AAA rumor out of his ass) or it's a deliberate plant by the Braves, to create leverage with the Rays and Cubs, who have CFers that the Braves likely covet in BJ Upton, Reed Johnson and Marlon Byrd.

The problem with the Braves position is that they clearly want a RH upgrade in CF, but the options are extremely slim. So perhaps they're creating an illusion of options so that they have a bit more leverage with the Rays with Upton and the Cubs. If it seems like they might go with Pence, perhaps the asking price for Upton, Johnson/Byrd goes down. However, if the Rays know that Upton is really the Braves only option, the asking price could get astronomical.

I firmly believe however that the Braves would make no move before they'd trade for Pence and send Heyward to the minors. Again, if they would be willing to trade for Pence, they would have made a harder push for Beltran. Their actions indicate that they actually want a CFer first and foremost and are very unlikely to trade for an everyday corner OFer.

I'd rate the major remaining options as:

BJ Upton: 25%
Marlon Byrd: 15%
Reed Johnson: 30%
Hunter Pence: 10%
other: 10%
No move: 10%

Of course if the Braves do trade for Pence and option Heyward, this is all hogwash. I also will consider being done with the Braves this year.

If I'm The Wrenmaster

First, main needs, in relative order of importance:

1) RH reliever(s) - Yes, more important than a bat at this point. The lineup may or may not come around, but at current usage rates, our top relievers will fall apart if they don't get help. Moylan will help when he comes back, but he's no guarantee, and we need more than that anyway.

2) RH bat - Yes, even if Uggla comes around we need another RH bat in the every day lineup.

3) CF - Schafer is not the answer, McLouth is passable but we need more offense here, ideally not sacrificing defense.

4) utility guy - Lugo getting significant playing time is a problem, though not a HUGE one.

5) RH bench bat - Because there is a chance that McCann could get injured after Ross PH's, meaning the Braves would have to forfeit all subsequent games.

First target is a RH RP. One legit guy along the caliber of Rauch or Clippard. Whichever is cheaper. Also bring up one of Teheran and Vizcaino. It's getting to the point where they should be scaling back IP's anyway, might as well be doing that in the Atlanta pen. In a sort of backwards way of thinking, if you think Teheran will be in the opening day rotation next year, you bring him up, since he wouldn't be scheduled as a super 2. If you think he won't then bring up Viz. For the playoffs I'd actually consider bringing them both up. How sick would: Teheran, Vizcaino, Moylan, O'Flaherty, Rauch, Venters, Kimbrel be? That bullpen might give up negative runs. You could easily afford to take your starters out before they face the lineup a 3rd time, every time. Venters and O'Flaherty as lefty specialists?

Trade for Upton, Marlon Byrd or Reed Johnson, in that order. Carlos Beltran is nonsense, even if he is willing to play CF, what kind of defense do you expect? Can we afford to have both him and Chipper in the lineup, depending on their bats with all that instability? You're not going to fucking demote or platoon Heyward, get the fuck over that.

Upton is my first choice, as we'd see the defense in CF actually improve, and he's got decent OBP, power and speed skills. He's not a leadoff hitter, despite his speed, but you deal with that. He's both a RH bat and a plus plus plus defender in CF. And Jordan Schafer would be gone. I'd go Minor + any of our position players besides Pastornicky or Salcedo. I haven't wrapped my head around if the Rays want Salcedo or Pastornicky straight up. Value seems right, but we need Chipper's eventual successor.

If the Cubs would act reasonably about Byrd, I'd target him, but Hendry has shown some reluctance to trade players who are under contract for next year. Is it a bluff? Who knows?

Reed Johnson would be a rental and would come cheap and would be an upgrade in CF offensively, is RH and wouldn't be a gigantic downgrade defensively.

Trade for Jonny Gomes as a pure utility guy/RH bench bat, if we can get him for next to nothing. Otherwise, do without and fucking tell Fredi to use Ross as a pinch hitter.

Finally, I'd trade Jair Jurrjens, if you can get very good value, but that's for another post.

Craig Kimbrel shouldn't pitch with a 3 run lead in the 9th, at all.

Fredi Gonzalez's usage of his bullpen gets a lot of flack on the interwebs. Things like his refusal to use his best relievers in a tie game on the road, using Proctor in anything other than a 12 run blowout, underusing some younger arms in the bullpen while overusing others (Venters and Kimbrel), the list could go on and on.

However, this post isn't so much about criticizing Fredi as it is something almost no manager would do, so I'm more pointing out a strategy I think could be effective for teams in certain situations, and especially for the Atlanta Braves of 2011-2012.

The save is a dumb stat. If you don't agree with that statement, just stop reading, move along, nothing good will come from further reading of this post. However, the save is still highly valued in baseball, for reasons that are not entirely clear. It's an important stat in: deciding how much money free agent relievers get; it actually seems to influence many managers' strategies, like the stat somehow counts in the win column; and for the purposes of this article it is really influential in player arbitration cases.

Craig Kimbrel is a great relief pitcher, the numbers he's put up this year are among, if not the, absolute best in baseball. He's also under full team control, making the major league minimum. This is awesome for the Atlanta Braves, as it frees up significant financial resources to pursue other spending avenues within the constraints of a limited budget.

However, this will not always be the case. There will come a time when he becomes arbitration eligible.

For relief pitchers, arbitration awards are dominated by saves. Great DIP stats to the wind, for whatever reason, saves dominate. Because of this, Craig Kimbrel could be in line for a pretty nice pay bump when he qualifies for arbitration status. As things look right now, he might be not only at the top of pitchers for his age group, but might be at the top of all relief pitchers at that point.

This is a nice problem to have, because it does mean that he's pitching extremely well. However, this burden on the Atlanta Braves could be lighter (or the benefit could be greater, depending on how you chose to look at it).

Moving from arbitration pay to workload for a second, another issue is that Kimbrel is being overworked. Now, some of this is not Fredi Gonzalez's fault. The Atlanta Braves have played in a lot of very close games, necessitating using your highest leverage relivers much more than average. The Atlanta Braves are also very top heavy in the bullpen, with Venters and Kimbrel being exceptional, but having questionable relievers after that, especially right handed relievers. It'd be really nice if we could figure out some way to lighten Kimbrel's workload, without taking him out of those situations where we need him the most.

For the third prong, let's talk about the three run lead in the ninth inning and the value of throwing a scoreless inning in that scenario. We'll use Win Probability Added (WPA) to show how important (or unimportant) a scoreless 9th inning with a 3 run lead is. Using yesterday's Braves-Rockies game as an example we see Craig Kimbrell's scoreless bottom of the 9th with a three run lead was worth a WPA of .053. This isn't an entirely meaningless number, but you'll notice Jonny Venters' scoreless inning was worth more, and 6 Braves positions players had a higher WPA for the game. Basically Kimbrell's number means that his scoreless ninth inning increased the braves chances of winning the game from 95% to 100%. A 5% increase in probability. Not negligible, but not earth shattering either.

Stepping away from an advanced stat like WPA, just think about it for a second using a more flawed, yet better understood statistic, ERA. A pitcher with a 27.00 ERA is obviously historically, laughably bad. Yet, that's essentially the ERA you have to have in order to blow a 3 run lead in one inning (of course barring unearned runs). So while a scoreless ninth with a three run lead is valuable, it's not all that valuable.

Yet the three run lead in the ninth inning is treated for our purposes just like an extremely high leverage situation. It takes a toll of 1 IP + warming up in the bullpen on Kimbrel's overworked arm and adds to the amount of money he will get in arbitration.

So if we're looking for a way to cut down on the load on Kimbrel's arm, and save the team some money for a possible extension (Tommy Hanson or Jason Heyward maybe?) then it'd seem like an obvious choice. Stop putting Kimbrel out there with three run leads in the ninth inning. Let someone else pitch besides Venters and Kimbrel in those situations. You'd save your team some money by distributing those saves to guys who aren't going to be arbitration guys to begin with (either because they're past arbitration years or not going to get enough saves to matter anyway) and we can give Kimbrel some much needed rest.

Remember, saves don't win games, wins win games.

The Difference Between a Statistic and a Model

Something that has long annoyed me about baseball statistics is the misuse of terms. For instance, we talk about Batting Average and Slugging Percent. Yet, batting average is a percent (the percentage of base hits in a given number of plate appearances that result in either an out, error or hit) while slugging percent is an average (the average number of bases per at bat that resulted in a hit, error or out, not counting an error as a base). But that's really just being nit picky. Who really cares if you use incorrect terms in those regards? It wouldn't really change the way that anybody looks at either statistic.

However, there is a more nefarious misunderstanding of terminology, and it actually tends to infect those who claim to have the best understanding of statistics. That is the difference between a statistic and a model.

A statistic is simply a single measure of some attribute. Batting average is a statistic. It takes the total sample (all outcomes for all plate appearances), isolates a subgroup (plate appearances resulting in a hit, error or walk) and then puts as the numerator a further subgroup (hits). Mostly, statistics don't make value judgments. You can say that the focus on a given statistic makes a value judgment, that is choosing to pay attention to batting average emphasizes that getting hits is more important than taking walks. However, the statistic itself says "hey, here's some information, use it as you will."

A model on the other hand makes value judgments. Models take phenomena and try to make predictions. For instance, OPS is a very simplistic model. Because slugging percentage and on base percentage measure entirely different things, it doesn't make statistical sense to crudely add the two. The value comes from a belief that when you add the two you get a rough model that gives you some sense of a hitter's value that you wouldn't be able to get from either of the component statistics in isolation. Yet, OPS is often referred to as a statistic, as if it was just giving raw information. Yet, it isn't. An OPS of .800 has all sorts of ways of happening. It could be a .300 OBP and a .500 slugging percent, it could be .400 and .400, etc. The model makes a value judgment in assigning equal importance to OBP and slugging pct. When you look at OPS as a statistic, you are forced to think that OBP and slugging percent have equal worth. Whereas with batting average, you can value the statistic as little or as much as you would like, you aren't forced to value anything to any particular degree.

And therein lies the problem, by calling OPS a statistic, people are mislead into believing that value judgment. By calling it a statistic you are lead to believe "hey, I'm not saying anything myself here, that's just what the numbers say." However, if you understand OPS as a model, you can think "hey, models can be inaccurate."

Most of the new "statistics" that the sabermetric crowd has been pushing lately are models, not statistics. There is nothing wrong with building a model, but you must call it a model. Calling it a statistic, while possibly simpler, is inherently misleading. WAR is a model of predicting how many wins a player adds above a replacement level player. It's not only a model, it's a model built out of other models (for instance a model for what a replacement player is worth, the relative merits of a stolen base v. getting caught stealing, etc). Yet sabermetricians tend to say "these are the stats" as opposed to "this is the prediction the model gives." Additionally, when you know you are working with a model, it's easier to gauge how reliable the model is. Models are inherently more reliable the closer they are to the most common values. For instance WAR is probably MUCH more accurate the closer it gets to players who give relatively average component statistics. WAR is probably pretty inaccurate for a guy like Albert Pujols, who usually is near the top 5% in almost every offensive category.

Furthermore, calling a model a statistic shields you from talking about the assumptions that the model makes. For instance, in calling OPS a statistic, nobody really discusses the assumption that on base percent and slugging percent are of equivalent worth. WAR assumes that a given player is just as valuable on one team as he is on another. And that's definitely not realistic. For instance a player who hits a lot of homeruns is much more valuable on a team that has a high OBP and low slugging percent than on a team with a high slugging percent, but low OBP. War assumes that a given player will perform to the exact same level in all playing environments (for instance, flyball hitters are probably much more valuable in the AL East, where all the ballparks are very hitter hitter friendly). These effects are often minor, but can be important at the margins, which is where WAR is used most often. Nobody needs WAR to tell you that Albert Pujols is more valuable than Alex Gonzalez, we use it most where the numbers are close, which is where the numbers are most likely to fall prey to these otherwise small issues.

Now, this would be all good and fine if sabermetricians just called these models stats for convenience's sake. However, it definitely seems that very few of them understand this difference very clearly.

In sabermetric circles, it lately seems as if the more complex you can make a model, the better. Sabermetricians don't really understand that the more complex you make a model, the more things you have to finely calibrate, and the more data you need to make your model accurate. A simple model may make questionable assumptions at times, but it's relatively easy to calibrate. A complicated model needs tons of data and is only really good for the centermost values.

Emmanuel Derman, perhaps the worlds most famous living financial modeler, once said "people often forget the point of models. You can't make a perfect model, because the only perfect model is reality itself, which is too complex, which is why you wanted to make a model in the first place. You have to find the right balance of simplicity, easy to understand assumptions and relevant assumptions. A model with tons of difficult to understand and complex assumptions that may be very relevant is really no better than a simple model with easy to understand assumptions that may not be as relevant at all times. Because the more complex your model gets, the less you are able to understand when it is going to be accurate and when it is going to be inaccurate." His point was, if you build up incredibly complicated models, it often gives a false sense of accuracy, because it is so often difficult to see where the assumptions might be faulty, because there are so many of them. That's basically the philosophical mistake that Long Term Capital Management made. I often feel like that's the mistake a lot of sabermetricians make. They're so obsessed with coming up with the one model (which they call a statistic) to rule them all, to give the ultimate measure of a player's value, that they forget they're building models. They forget to keep track of where they made assumptions and talk about cases in which their model may very well be highly inaccurate. The point of a model is to make relationships easier to understand, not more obscure. Yet that is often what sabermetricians do when they create new versions of WAR. They obscure the relationships they're trying to express in order to create the one model to rule them all, the one model that spits out a perfect measure of value.

So what can be done? Well, as my econometrics professor often said, "if in doubt, return to the simplest statistics possible." WAR is comprised of a lot of simple statistics that don't make value judgments. Return to those and debate their relative importance. And if in doubt return to the simplest statistics of all, things like walks/PA, singles/PA, doubles/PA, HR/PA, etc. Then talk about how those should relatively weigh and how accurate or inaccurate the various models may be, and in exceptional cases, you probably shouldn't rely on the models at all.

The attraction to WAR is that it does this for you, it makes implicit assumptions about these various values. Yet, this is really its downfall as well. People trust these assumptions when they may very well be far from trustworthy. That's what happens when you confuse a model with a statistic.

**Yes I am aware that there are different version of WAR, they all do the same thing I am talking about here, and if anything this further proves my point that WAR is a model and not a statistic.**

On Coin Flips, Hot Streaks and the MLB Playoffs

When I was in college, I once set up the following experiment for an independent study I did in psychology and economics:

A coin flipping contest with a prize of $10.

There were 128 students involved in the contest. It's pretty easy to get college kids to flip coins for free pizza and a chance at enough money for 4 beers at the local college dive bar. It was set up NCAA Bracket style such that there were 7 rounds, with each round half the pool being eliminated until we had a final champion. One person got to flip the coin and the other person got to call it. Who got to do what was determined by drawing straws. The coin had to go at least 7 feet in the air and hit the ground.

Now the tournament was completely uninteresting and actually wasn't the focus of the study. What the students said after the tournament was what I was trying to get at.

Coin flips are obviously luck, especially when the coin flips more than a couple of times and even more so when different people are flipping the coin each time. You'd have to be borderline crazy to ascribe victory in this sort of tournament to anything other than luck.

However, in talking to the winner, and even those that had made it to the last few rounds, they all described a feeling that they could predict the coin flip. The winner going so far to say that he was basically 100% confident he was going to win the final matchup. Those who had won several rounds all ascribed their winnings to something other than pure luck usually "getting a feel for how the coin would flip and how to flip if it I was the one doing the toss." The winner actually said "how could you call that luck? I picked the correct side seven straight times, what are the chances of that happening?" Well, he's right that it is extremely unlikely that a given person picks correctly seven straight times in a coin flipping contest, there is less than a 1% chance of that happening. In fact the chances are exactly 1/128.

However, the problem is that we had 128 students and a contest set up such that somebody had to win. Stepping away from an individual in the coin flipping contest's point of view, it was clear that somebody had to be lucky and it just happened to be him. But our brain doesn't like that explanation. Our brain is designed so that, as much as possible, we don't ascribe unlikely events to dumb luck. The winner earnestly believed he had some sort of skill in predicting those coin flips.

In his career Barry Bonds came to the plate 12,606 times. In his career he reached base 44.4% of the time and got a base hit 29.8% of the times he didn't walk, sacrifice or get hit by a pitch.

Imagine a time when Barry Bonds reeled off seven consecutive hits. What do you think the announcers were saying? They were probably saying something along the lines of "wow, Barry is just completely locked in right now! That baseball must seem as big as a watermelon to him!" His manager would be elated and thinking about the carnage his zoned in slugger would be doing against that day's pitcher. Not only was it Barry Bonds, but it was Barry Bonds on a torid hot streak. Now, the fact is that while seven straight hits is highly unlikely, for a player who gets a hit 29.8% of the time and had just under 10,000 ABs, you'd expect it to happen right around 7 times. So while it was unlikely for it to be happening at any given point in time, by just pure dumb luck, you'd expect it to happen seven times over his career. Yet do players, managers, fans or announcers ascribe these sorts of streaks to luck? No, they ascribe them to being hot and skill.

Now imagine we flip the script and Barry Bonds has just had back to back 0-4 days, zero for his last eight. The announced would be talking about how Barry needed to make x adjustment, that his timing was off, that he wasn't seeing the ball. His hitting coach might even suggest some sort of change. He would be cold. Except for he wouldn't. When a player doesn't get a hit 70% of the time, there's roughly a 5% chance that he will go a couple of games without getting a hit. in a full season, you'd expect that to happen several times, just by pure, dumb, bad luck. Yet, we almost always view it as the hitter is cold and may actually need to make some sort of adjustment to his swing.

To be sure, skill or lack of it has something to do with it. A player who gets a hit 35% of the time is much more likely to have a long hitting streak than a player who gets a hit just 25% of the time. But the majority of it is luck. You can think of it this way, if you do something (come to bat) enough times, highly improbable things (really long hitting streaks, really ice cold streaks) end up being likely to happen at some point.

Going back to my coin flipping contest, let's imagine a sport where the absolute best teams in the league win just 60% of their games. Now let's imagine we created a tournament where we took only those teams that already didn't win all that much more than half the time, and had them play only other similarly good teams (that won between 55% and 60% of their games) in one five game series to open and then seven game series subsequently.

Think about that for a second, we are only pitting teams that win between 55% and 60% of their games against one another in relatively short playoff series. You'd expect the best teams to have very slightly better odds, but mostly it would just be luck. Teams that are that closely matched would take several hundred games of playing one another to really sort out which team was actually better. Yet, you can bet, just like the coin flip participants, that those that went out early would be called chokers, and the champion would have put together a magical run and earned their way alongside the greats of the sport. Nobody would characterize the World Series winner (oops, did I let that slip) as just lucky, they would have ridden dominant pitching and "clutch hitting" all the way to glory. Because that's how our brains work. While it's risky to bet on any given winner, it's a virtually guaranteed bet that the winner, and especially the winner's fans, won't think the win was pure luck. When betting on chance, the only certainty is that people won't believe they're betting on chance.

Confirmation Bias and Ball Four

Imagine the following scenario:

A pitcher has been pitching a relatively decent game, showing decent control throughout the game. The pitcher has just thrown three balls to a hitter to reach a three balls no strikes count. These three pitches were all relatively close to the plate, not extremely wild. Assume that the pitcher has no desire to walk the batter and would like to throw a strike.

What do you expect the result of the next pitch to be?

Most astute baseball fans would guess a strike, as the pitcher took a little off and did his best to guarantee he did not walk the hitter.

Next imagine the following scenario:

A pitcher has a hitter in an 0-2 count. The pitcher would obviously like a strikeout and would love to get the hitter to chase a pitch. The hitter doesn't want to strike out and will likely swing at not only a strike, but anything that he thinks is close to being a strike. The hitter sees a pitch and does not swing.

Do you think the pitch was probably a strike or a ball?

This one seems even easier. It seems borderline near certain that the pitch was an obvious ball.

What these two thought experiments show is the following: in a 3-0 count, we expect pitchers to throw strikes and on 0-2 counts where the hitter doesn't swing, we expect that the pitcher threw a ball. It's reasonable to believe that umpires, who observe a LOT of baseball, have these same sorts of observations. They know that in general those tendencies hold true. They actually can't unknow this, even if they wanted to.

Which brings me to the new-ish book Scorecasting by Moskowitz and Wertheim, and particularly the first chapter on omission bias.

Amongst other claims, the two authors attribute the fact that umpires are more likely to call a 3-0 pitch a strike and an 0-2 a ball to omission bias. For the unitiated, omission bias is the idea that we view it as worse to do something bad than to not do something equally good. That an action leading to a bad result is worse than an inaction leading to the same bad result. Wikipedia has a more thorough explanation here.

Now omission bias obviously exists and has been proven to be something our brains do in a myriad of psychological studies. However, I think Moskowitz and Wertheim are a little cavalier in their ascription in at least the case with umpires calling balls and strikes.

There is another type of cognitive bias, that is very well known and is believed to be amongst our strongest and most difficult to overcome cognitive biases: confirmation bias and a sort of subranch of confirmation bias, selective perception.

Confirmation bias has been well understood for a long time. We tend to interpret things in accordance to the current understanding we have of the world around us. Confirmation bias isn't so much about seeing what you want to see, as much as it's about seeing what you expect to see. Some people in fact refer to the phenomenon as expectations bias. When an observed event doesn't conform to our beliefs, we either twist it in such a way that it does or discard it entirely as a mere aberration. We see what we expect to see, for the most part.

The strange thing about this sort of bias is that in many cases, it can actually make our perceptions more accurate, unlike most cognitive biases. Say for instance that you see a bird shooting by and you really didn't see enough of it to know what color it was, but you know that a lot of crows live near by and often fly by your window. Without you actually thinking about it, you will likely have "seen" the bird as being black. Now this is obviously going to much more accurate than if your brain picked random colors to see the bird as. However, it makes you biased against seeing blue birds.

It is my belief that this type of bias is the primary reason behind an umpire's actions when calling balls and strikes. The umpire knows that on 3-0 counts a pitcher is substantially more likely than normal to throw a strike and that hitters often "take all the way" on 3-0 counts, regardless of where the pitch is, hoping to eventually draw a walk. Likewise, umpires know that pitchers are more likely to "try to get a hitter to chase" a ball on an 0-2 count and that hitters will usually swing at anything close.

So what would this theory of the explanation predict? Well, one thing to notice is that on 0-2 counts, the umpire has two pieces of information when a hitter doesn't swing: 1) that it's an 0-2 count and 2) that the hitter didn't swing. This is in opposition to a 3-0 count where the hitter probably won't swing unless he's Jeff Francouer or it's the one pitch in the one tiny area the hitter is looking for. There the umpire only has one piece of information, that it is a 3-0 count. Therefore we would expect the "bias" to be much more magnified for 0-2 counts than for 3-0 counts. The umpire has twice as many reasons to think the pitch was a ball on an 0-2 count where the hitter failed to swing than he has reasons to think a pitch was a strike on a 3-0 pitch where the hitter failed to swing.

Luckily Moskowitz and Wertheim provide us with these probabilities and this prediction turns out to be wildly correct. On an 0-2 pitch that a hitter doesn't swing at, that is in the strike zone, the umpire calls the pitch a strike just 57.7% of the time. This is in comparison with 80% accuracy calling a strike a strike in all cases. That's a whopping 22.3% difference in accuracy. Compare this to the opposite situation, a 3-0 count where the pitch is actually a ball and the hitter doesn't swing. Here the umpire calls a ball a ball 80% of the time on 3-0 counts, in comparison to getting the call right 87% of the time on all counts. A mere 7% difference. While Omission bias wouldn't really explain why this difference in differences should be so stark, 22.3% v. 7%, confirmation/expectations bias does.

There are a lot of other studies that could be done with ball and strike data combined with pitch f/x data to figure out which effect is more likely driving the phenomena. For instance, we could study the correlation effect of whether or not a pitcher throwing a lot of strikes on a given day makes an umpire more likely to call a given pitch a strike. Expectation bias would seem to predict that the old baseball observation that you've got to establish that you can throw strikes before an umpire will give you a borderline call might have some truth to it. Omission bias would say nothing about this effect. Likewise we could examine whether or not hitters that are known to have a "good eye for the strike zone" get more borderline pitches called balls. Again, this would go along with traditional baseball observations and beliefs, but it needs to be studied more thoroughly than simply trusting traditional beliefs. Stepping away from balls and strikes, we could study whether or not an umpire is likely to call a good basestealer safe incorrectly on stolen base attempts. Expectation bias would say that since the umpire expects that the runner will likely be safe, he's more likely to call him safe in borderline cases.

I'm not saying that omission bias plays no role in this phenomenon. What I am saying is that we should really look at confirmation/expectation bias more closely, because there is at least some evidence that it could play a role, if not the major role in explaining this phenomenon.

Do you inefficiently like certain players?

We always believe that winning isn't everything, it's the only thing. However, i wanted to question this. Basically, Brian McCann is probably the most universally loved Brave at this point. Heyward may generate more excitement, Chipper may be more sentimental, but Brain McCann, for a lot of hardcore Braves fans is the heart and soul of the the team. Heyward is too new to really be attached to and we've all gotten somewhat used ot the idea that Chipper is going to retire soon. So, with that in mind, I created the following poll. Would you be more likely to watch or go to a Braves game if you knew that while they would win one game fewer, Brian McCann would be on the team, or in the alternative that they would win one game more, but would have somebody like AJ Pierzynski catching?

If you're not a huge McCann fan, or even a Braves fan, you can think of the poll as asking "what would I like more, my favorite player on a team that won one game less or my favorite player gone, but the team wins one more game." Also, consider that while the one win may or may not determine whether the team makes the playoffs, its within the range where it is at least possible that it could. Which is why I picked the number I did for the Braves. Basically in the area where it may be enough to win a wildcard, even taking the additional loss, but also might cost them the wildcard, or they may even miss the playoffs regardless of the single win.

Which would you rather have?

How To Argue With Someone About Heyward Hitting Second

So the Jason Heyward hitting sixth thing has taken off. He did hit second yesterday, but only because Nate McLouth was out. Reading Fredi Gonzalez's quotes on the issue is painful, as is David O'Brien's condescending head nodding on the topic. (O'Brien's analysis of the issue seems to be along the lines of "well, he rides a Harley, and there was that thing with Hanley Ramirez, so this guy has to be infallible.")

What doesn't seem to work when debating these issues with people who support Heyward hitting sixth is logic and facts. You can point out all sorts of facts like the second hitter comes to bat substantially more and comes to bat with virtually identical numbers of runners on base as the sixth spot. You can point out the fact that Heyward has by far the most walks on the team and hasn't scored on any of those walks. You can point out the fact that it makes no sense to think that Gonzalez is good enough to protect Heyward, but isn't good enough to protect Uggla. (another shot at O'Brien is that he has asked the question "for those who think Heyward should be hitting 2nd, who will protect Uggla then?!" and then said after Gonzalez has had an admittedly good start with the bat "hey all you guys who don't think Gonzalez is good enough to protect Heyward in the 6th spot, well...." And he doesn't seem to have the slightest clue that those two statements are totally incongruous.)

You can point all that out and none of it matters to them. So I am going to point out some ways to argue the point. These aren't good arguments and are filled with all sorts of logical fallacies and misconceptions about the game of baseball, but that's what these people need to be convinced by. It's like telling your superstitious grandmother that you had a dream she didn't get a flu shot and then died of a snakebite to convince her to get a flu shot, instead of just trying to reason with her.

1) Heyward has been cold in the sixth spot. He may have some homers, but his batting average, the primary way we should evaluate hitters has been an abysmal .240. That is the number they put on the scoreboard. Last year he hit .277 from the #2 spot. Obviously he needs to be moved up to the #2 spot to "get him going" because hitters hit totally differently depending on what spot in the batting order they're in.

2) We may not know more about baseball than Fredi Gonzalez, he rides a Harley Davidson afterall. However, who knows more about baseball in the history of the world than Bobby Cox? Bobby Cox hit Heyward second. So, really it's not so much that I'm questioning Fredi Gonzalez, I'm questioning why he isn't following the example of a HOF manager who knew more about how to put his players in a position to succeed than perhaps anyone in the history of the game.

3) I appreciate the fact that we're trying to get McOut going and all, but it's a failed experiment, we need to just cut losses with the guy and trade him along with Kawakami to some Russian League team.

4) Heyward is being groomed for the #3 spot, so we should hit him #2, which is closer to Chipper's spot, and thus he'll be able to more closely observe Chipper.

5) The Braves lineup has struggled thus far and we just need to shake things up.

Now, don't think through any of these statements too hard yourself. Definitely don't apply logic to them. Just keep in mind that sometimes you can reach a correct conclusion for totally nonsensical reasons.

Studies Show...

A recent paper has shown that merely linking something lends credibility to what is being said, regardless of the content of what is being said in the linked article.

This makes sense and seems to go along with my intuitions on the matter.

It's Hard To Believe That One Person Can Spew This Much Fail

I believe we have found Murray Chass and Joe Morgan's love child. In response to Keith Law's latest insider column "goldenbear1975a" posted the following:

goldenbear1975a (4/13/2011 at 8:44 AM) Report Violation

Sabermatrics does not win baseball games and RBI do,
just ask the Oakland A's
RBI is the second most import offensive stat in all of baseball other than the Run scored.
Hating on the win is stupid as well, it is by far the most important stat in all of baseball, since winning is all that matters.
I would rather win every game 6-5 and have my sp have ERA of 4.50 then lose every game 1-0.

goldenbear1975a (4/13/2011 at 9:13 AM) Report Violation

Yes and no, if a pitcher is given a big lead (7-0 after 3 innings) and they just throw strikes and give up 4 runs and win 10-4 that is their job on that day but their WHIP might be high. But who cares if their team wins the game.
Bill James and money ball is so overrated, I would rather have a team full of 100 RBI guys that means you score runs, then a team full of OPS of 1000


Wow, just wow. It's hard to believe that somebody, in this modern age, can misunderstand baseball as badly as this guy.

Is Brian McCann No Longer a Power Hitter?

Fredi Gonzalez has seemingly "settled" the issue of who his cleanup hitter is, and it seems to be Brian McCann. This seems to have happened because it looks like Fredi starts his lineup by penciling in Jason Heyward in the 6th spot and then builds off that alternating lefty righty. So Because Heyward (left handed) must hit 6th, that puts Uggla (right handed) 5th and McCann (left handed) 4th. The Heyward hitting 6th issue has been talked to death, and I won't revisit it here, other than to say, for all the world, that seems to be the primary factor in why McCann is the cleanup hitter.

Now McCann has been a good power hitter and a good candidate for the spot for most of his career. He's been the best power hitting catcher since he came into the league.

However, McCann has seen his power numbers steadily drop since his best power year, 2008 (he had a slightly higher slugging percentage in 2006, but that was mostly because he had a much higher BABIP).

In 2008, Brian McCann was a behemoth. In Just 145 games, he hit 42 doubles and 23 homeruns and even added in a triple. 66 extra base hits from the catcher's spot is some serious damage.

In 2009, we saw a slight dip, but seemingly nothing to be concerned with. McCann still hit 21 homers, which isn't statistically different from 23. However, his doubles did drop from 42 to 35. That was a more significant drop than the homers, but still probably nothing to be concerned over.

In 2010, the homers stayed the same, again likely keeping any alarms from going off. However, his doubles fell again, this time all the way to 25.

People tend to not pay much attention to doubles, but it's long been my contention that doubles are perhaps the most criminally overlooked stat in baseball. Doubles rates, when combined with homers tend to give you a pretty good idea of how often a player is hitting the ball with authority. Comparing McCann's 2010 season to his 2008 season, just looking at doubles and homers, the alarms are beginning to go off:

2008: 42 2B, 23 HR = 65 HR + 2B
2010: 25 2B, 21 HR = 46 HR + 2B

So McCann's HRs + 2Bs have dropped by almost 30%. McCann almost hit more doubles in 2008 than he hit homers and doubles combined in 2010.

So what could be causing this? I can identify three possible factors as being most likely: bad luck, bad health, premature aging due to the rigors of the catching position.

Bad luck is often underappreciated in baseball. Often times the difference between an average season and a very good season is just a few balls finding a couple extra inches left or right. I was perfectly willing to say that McCann's 2009 may well have been bad luck. 7 doubles and 2 home runs is entirely within the range of possible bad luck, especially since McCann played fewer games. However, he then tacked on another, mostly healthy, season and his numbers dropped even further in 2010. Could McCann's power outage be bad luck? It's possible, but at this point he's had enough AB's that it seems unlikely that bad luck plays much more than a small role.

We know McCann had vision issues off and on for the past few years. We know that hitting a baseball with authority takes excellent vision. Maybe McCann's power outage is the result of those vision issues and those vision issues are correctable. Well, this could very well be the case. However, if this is the explanation, then it seems hard to make the case that the vision issues are really correctable at this point. If it's a problem with his vision, then it has taken nearly two years and we still haven't seen McCann consistently hit the ball with authority. Also cutting against the idea that this is mostly a vision issue is the fact that McCann has substantially improved his walk rate. If he's truly having major vision problems, then it would seem unlikely that he's also able to have a better ability to identify strikes and balls. McCann also has seen a decrease in his swing and miss percentage, again cutting against the idea that this is a vision issue.

Lastly is the explanation that no Braves fan wants to hear. It could be possible that the catching a lot of games in the Atlanta heat for several years has just worn him down to the point that he just isn't as strong as he once was. Catching is a hard job and because McCann's bat has been so valuable to the Braves over the years, he has caught a LOT of games. Very few catchers have long careers where they maintain high power numbers throughout, and most of those that have have played for a long time with high power played in places that are nothing like the heat of Atlanta. Carlton Fisk played his career mostly outside of anything like serious heat. Mike Piazza played in Southern California, which can get hot, but not sweltering and New York. Perhaps McCann is just worn down. Sadly this explanation seems to make the most sense. It would explain why McCann has maintained every other part of his offensive game, and in fact improved his walk rate, but has seen a steady drop in his power.

For right now, McCann is the Braves number 4 hitter. For right now he has no extra base hits. One or both of those are going to have to change in a hurry, or this season could unravel quickly. Even if McCann is now more of a singles hitter, he could still be a much better than average offensive catcher, especially considering his improving walk rates. However, if his power drop is real and not just an aberration, he certainly shouldn't be hitting 4th.

Something is Wrong When You Get Outsmarted by Cholly

First, this isn't second guessing. I said this ALL, before it happened and even tweeted how dumb it was before the backbreaking grand slam happened. It was first guessing.

So in a situation where the backup catcher, a RH and the pitcher spot where due up, Fredi G. brought in lefty specialist George Sherrill. It was pretty much an automatic that Cholly was going to pinch hit for Schneider and it was beyond obvious that if the pitcher's spot came up, a pinch hitter would be up there as well.

So it was a near guarantee that Sherrill was going to come on to face 3 RH hitters, if you were paying attention to the game situation. In this situation you need to put in a pitcher who can get out either handed batter out. Eric O'Flaherty would have been a good choice. Even Christhian Martinez would have been decent, as he wouldn't have walked anybody and made the guys hit their way on. Instead, a guy who should only ever face LH batters came in, and couldn't retire a single guy he faced, loading the bases.

This was bad enough.

However, as I said in my bullpen preview, Scott Linebrink, at this point in his career, is a decent bullpen guy, as long as he only comes in with the bases empty. He's prone to giving up the long ball, but is good if the worst he can do is give up a solo HR. But you NEVER bring him up with runners on base or especially with the bases loaded.

Yet, here comes Scott Linebrink and gives up a completely predictable grand slam. Was it guaranteed to happen? Obviously not, but it was substantially more likely to happen by bringing in Linebrink.

The worst part of this whole exchange was how predictably bad it all turned out. None of this was shocking to anybody who knows this team. One thing is known about Sherrill, he can't get RH hitters out. One thing is known about Linebrink, he gives up the long ball.

Cholly didn't pull out some managerial genius, he just made completely normal, predictable moves. Yet Fredi G's completely undefendable moves made Cholly look like a genius. You gotta try pretty hard to make Cholly look like a genius.

I don't know what's more likely the case and what's worse, if Fredi G thought these moves out and somehow thought they were good ideas or if he just wasn't really paying attention.

A Possible Real Impact Call Up That The Braves Should Make Sooner, Rather Than Later

There is a possible, very realistic call up the Braves could make this year that might well put them over the edge in what is likely to be a really, really close race with the Phillies. This call up is a legit major league talent and is already in the organization. Imagine these numbers being added to the team:

in 15 games he could well hit .300/.420/.600 with 3 homers, 12 runs, 7 RBI, 4 doubles. And those numbers would be just a regular, "that's what he's projected to do" type numbers, not an aberrantly hot start.

Who is this late season miracle worker and why in God's name hasn't Wren called the guy up already?!

Well, that's the problem. The guy has already been called up. His name is Jason Heyward.

Huh?!

Over a full season Jason Heyward is slated to lose 15 games worth of AB's, by hitting 6th instead of 2nd. Those AB's will be taken by Nate McLouth. Nate McLouth who best case scenario probably hits .265/.350/.450 over that span.

David O'Brien snidely suggested the other day via Twitter that people upset over those numbers are just upset because they have Heyward on their fantasy team, implying that those additional numbers from Heyward wouldn't benefit the team. I don't have Heyward on my fantasy team, as another deranged braves fan payed $70 for him in my auction league (Heyward went for more dough than Pujols or Joey Votto). However, I do think that those numbers are significant. Especially because there really is absolutely no pro at all to losing that many Heyward at bats. O'Brien's quote also has the chuckle worthy implication that Bobby Cox hit Heyward 2nd last year because he had Heyward on his fantasy team.

First let us consider the supposed pro, which is that Heyward is a run producer, long term, and the 6th spot is kinda like the 5th spot, which is kinda like the 4th spot, which is sorta like the 3rd spot, which is where Heyward will eventually hit according to everyone you talk to about the kid's future (some people say he should always hit 2nd, but I'm actually there referring to where he likely will eventually hit, after Chipper retires). Now, there is the obvious way of looking at things, that the 2nd spot is actually numerically closer to the 3rd spot, and there's the more subtle way of looking at things and see what the spots in the order do. However, the 2nd spot is really much more of the dual run creator and producer type role, as is the 3rd spot. And this is what Heyward is best at, both driving in runs and getting on base to create runs. In contrast, the 6th spot is more of a low end run producing role and is definitely not where you want someone who is going to be a major run creator, as you'll often be left with depending on the 8th and 9th hitters to knock him in. So both ways of looking at the situation say that if you are worried about "grooming him for the 3 spot" which is dubious reasoning to begin with, it still says you should bat Heyward 2nd.

The second argument for Heyward in the 6th spot is that he's more of a run producer than a run creator and that is where his talents help the Braves the most this year. There are three major flaws to this logic. First is the idea that run producers are more valuable than run creators. Guys who get on base and get knocked in are extremely valuable. What has Atlanta mostly been missing for a lot of the decade? A consistent guy at the top of the lineup to get on base and run the bases well and get knocked in by the middle of the order. By batting Heyward 6th, you are wasting one of the most valuable assets in all of baseball: A guy you can pencil in for an over .400 OBP. The second major flaw is the idea that Heyward is more of a run producer than a run creator at this stage in his career. Heyward can have beastly power, however, it is still developing. Right now Heyward has one of the highest ground ball percentages on the team. He has a mostly downward/level swing. When he does hit homers they're mostly of the screaming line drive variety, not the towering majestic shots. At this point in his career, Heyward is more of a doubles hitter with occasional home run power who walks a ton. That type of hitter is best leveraged high in the order, because he's going to get on base more than he clears the bases. The third problem is the very idea that in the current Braves lineup the 6th spot will come to base with substantially more baserunners aboard is faulty to begin with. For now McLouth has actually come to plate with slightly more baserunners than Heyward. And while over the long haul I expect the 6th spot to have more "RBI opportunities" than the 2nd spot, I don't expect the difference to be dramatic, because it's right behind the two best homers/double hitters on the team, McCann and Uggla. Uggla is likely going to have a combined 70-80 homers and doubles. Meaning that a lot of those supposedly precious RBI opportunities are going to be already cleaned out by Uggla. Uggla's not some slap hitter that is going to be on base for Heyward and advance runners for Heyward very much. He's a very powerful hitter that is going to clear the bases a lot.

The third argument for hitting Heyward 6th is to provide Uggla with protection. I'm not really going to go into the dubious idea of lineup protection here, because I've found that the adherents to that belief take more than statistical convincing that lineup protection is a relatively minor point, if it exists at all. Even granting that lineup protection is real, this idea still makes no sense. Jason Heyward is the best all around hitter on the team, and he's patient. If the worry with lineup protection is that it hurts a patient hitter by having them pitched around, wouldn't you want to protect Jason Heyward more than Dan Uggla?! David O'Brien was going on last week about how with a decent start Gonzalez was adequately protecting Heyward, then this week busted out the gem "for those who want Heyward 2nd, who do you suppose is going to protect Uggla?!" Huh? So Gonzalez is good enough to protect the super patient, apt to be pitched around Heyward, but not good enough to protect Uggla, who often swings at and punishes pitches slightly off the plate anyway? Uggla, who fared relatively well in Florida with little to no lineup protection, all of the sudden needs Jason Heyward behind him in Atlanta? Yet Jason Heyward, who tore things up in the 2nd spot last year with protection doesn't need protection? Again, I think the idea of lineup protection is overblown by the traditional media, but even if it is important, it still doesn't support that Heyward should hit 6th.

In the end I doubt this convinces anybody either way. Those that support the Heyward in the 6th spot idea will find any support they can for it. You can approach a nameless beat reporter and Braves blogger with the statistic that Jason Heyward has now walked 8 times and has scored on exactly 0 of those walks and they'll retort "Heyward, you mean that guy who hit that three run bomb the other night?" as if that somehow meant something. Perhaps the most ironic thing is that last year when some fans were questioning Bobby Cox's use of Heyward in the #2 spot, these same people were defending Bobby. They would respond in absolute disbelief that you could question a guy as patient as Heyward in the 2nd spot and the nerve of questioning a hall of fame manager. In the end that probably points out a lot of what this is about. There are some who cannot question the team's manager, especially when he's well respected, as both Fredi and Bobby were and are. You can even make the case that some writers have an interest in backing the manager, and hoping that that backing leads to more access to the club. I'm generally supportive of Fredi, I think he runs a good clubhouse, is pretty good at figuring out when to take out the starting pitchers and I like the way he rotates his lineup regulars. However, batting Heyward 6th is, in my opinion, not the best usage of Heywards talents and not the best way to score more runs for the team, and I'm going to call it that way, not because I question everything the manager does, but because it's true.

So Fredi, please call up Heyward from the 6th spot and put him in the 2nd spot, where he thrived last year, and where Bobby had the foresight to pencil him in.

Part 3: In Depth Predictions for the 2011 Atlanta Braves (defense, overall record, standings, awards)

Part 1 Hitting Projections
Part 2 Pitching Projections

When it comes to defense, I'll look into all the advanced metrics, and they're taken into account when I write this, but when faced with a choice of relatively easy to understand ratings or more accurate but complicated metrics, I tend to chose the former. Thus, my rating system is a simple +/- system. The more plus signs, the better, the more minus signs, the worse. a +/- sign means the player is average for his position. For each individual player, I will say a bit about their various strengths and how they got to that overall rating. To get the overall ratings, you can't simply add the pluses and minuses, because some positions weigh more heavily. SS and CF carry much more weight than 2B and LF, for example.

Brian McCann (C): +

McCann's defense has be maligned over the years, but he made a big step forward in his primary negative last year, throwing runners out, which he nailed at a 30% clip. He's always been good at blocking balls, he gives pitchers a good target and calls a good game. To my mind he's a solid + defender at this point.

Freddie Freeman (1B): +/- (neutral)

I'm tempted to give a plus, but he's also made a few shaky plays in spring. I watched him some at Gwinnett last year and while he's not a gold glove type guy like Teixiera was, he's definitely an improvement over last year's situation. Bottom line is that he has good/very good range at first base and makes some good picks. His arm is good for a first baseman.

Dan Uggla (2B): --

Well, let's not belabor the obvious. He isn't a good second baseman defensively. However, I don't think he's quite as bad as people think. He's not Brooks Conrad, for example, which is what I think some Braves fans are scared we're going to have at second. His biggest problem isn't that he doesn't field balls cleanly, he makes plays on the balls he gets to, it's that his range is relatively limited. We're going to see a lot of balls hit up the middle get through this year.

Chipper Jones (3B): +/-

He is very smooth at third, extremely accurate with his throws, has a strong, though not excellent arm, has great instincts for the position and he positions himself well. However, his range is extremely limited at third at this point in his career, he flat out won't make a lot of plays. Depending on how limited his range gets, he could be a - defender, but he's moved well in the spring.

Alex Gonzalez (SS): +/-

People may be shocked by this one, expecting a plus, if not two pluses, but you could basically echo everything I said about Chipper with Gonzalez. He is smooth, has an average arm at SS that is very accurate, can make spectacular plays. However, for the SS position, his range is becoming more and more limited. There are a lot of balls that a + shortstop should get to that Sea Bass won't even touch.

Overall infield defense:

This is an infield defense that will end up looking a lot better than it is using traditional defensive statistics. I think they'll be near the top of the league in defensive fielding percentage. However, they just plain won't get to a lot of balls. In the end I think it comes out to being an average to slightly below average infield defense. They won't frustrate people with errors, but they won't make very many plays you wouldn't expect them to either.

Martin Prado (LF): +/-

Has the potential for a plus here with how he's looked in spring. Remember he frequently played LF in winter ball. It's really hard to project here much, but I don't expect any sort of travesty from Martin. He's too good of an athlete and works too hard.

Nate McClouth (CF): +/-

Nate's our only player with a gold glove and he's at best a neutral fielder. I'm tempted to give a minus here, but I think he's just average if I'm being objective about it. He's great at making a routine play look like a fantastic catch, due to the often times awkward routes he takes on fly balls. His arm is average, though at times inaccurate. He has decent speed for the position which makes up for some of his other shortcomings. If he had better instincts for the position he could potentially be a plus defender, but he's been playing CF for a while now, and it's probably folly to expect him to all of the sudden develop better instincts on fly balls.

Jason Heyward (RF): +++

Lost in all the hype of his hitting last year was the fact that many services had Heyward ranked at or near the absolute best at his position. He has excellent range, good instincts on fly balls and a very, very good arm that is also accurate. Comparing to Francouer, he has better range, not quite as strong of an arm, substantially better instincts and a more accurate arm. He should win gold gloves at some point in his career, though the award is a farce anyway.

Outfield defense overall is slightly above average. With Heyward's greatness in right, it could be well above average, except that Nate's mediocrity in CF weighs much more heavily than either of the two corners. If Prado turns out to be an above average defender in LF, then the combination fo being next to two plus defenders could really help Nate, but that's to be seen.

Predictions:

NL East:

Philadelphia 92-70
Atlanta 91-69 (wild card)
Florida Marlins 78-84
NY Mets 75-87
Washington Nationals 73-89

NL Central
Cincinnati

NL West
San Francisco, despite being very close, if not under, .500

A quick note about my playoff predictions: It has always been my belief that the playoffs are essentially random, thus I just have a little fun with them. Don't consider them serious. In all but the most extreme cases I believe that every team that makes the playoffs has pretty close to a 1/8 chance of winning the world series. Baseball isn't a game where you can take two teams that are relatively close and have the better team win much more than 50% in seven games. Over a 162 game season, the best teams that make the playoffs tend to win 5/8ths of the time and the worst teams that make the playoffs win 4/8ths of the time. Yet we expect the better team to win these series with any sort of regularity?!

SF over Philly and Atlanta over Cincy first round

Atlanta over SF

AL East
Boston

AL Central
Chicago

AL West
Texas

AL Wild Card
Oakland

Boston over Oakland and Texas over Chicago first round

Boston Over Texas

World Series:

Atlanta over Boston

NL MVP:
Joey Votto

NL Cy:
Cliff Lee

NL ROY:
Freddie Freeman

AL MVP:
Adrian Gonzalez

AL Cy:
Brett Anderson

AL ROY:
Jeremy Hellickson

Sources: Baseball-reference.com, Maple Street Press 2011 Braves Guide, Bill James Handbook 2011, Atlanta Journal Constitution Braves beat blog (David O'Brien, Carrol Rodgers), Paul Lebowitz's 2011 Baseball Guide, MLB.com, Capitol Avenue Club

Part 2: In Depth Predictions For the 2011 Atlanta Braves (rotation and bullpen)

Previous: Click here for Hitter Projections
Next: Click Here for Defense and overall predictions

A lot of readers will probably have found my lineup predictions for the 2011 Atlanta Braves to be a little bit optimistic. That's probably partly because I don't predict injuries in these spaces, I save those for my "Top Fears" column, which is to come later. Also, I really do believe that outside of the hole that Alex Gonzalez will be, the 2011 Atlanta Braves will have a fantastic lineup, perhaps the best in the National League.

Now, this optimism is going to be balanced by my projections for the pitching staff. I believe most will find my predictions for both the relievers and starters to be below what they're expecting.

Rotation Order:

1) Derek Lowe
2) Tim Hudson
3) Tommy Hanson
4) Jair Jurrjens
5) Brandon Beachy

First to be called up in case of injury: Mike Minor

Derek Lowe - 3.64 ERA 14-7 140 K's 55 BB's 14 HR's allowed 190 IP

Quick question, which pitcher out of Derek Lowe, Jair Jurrjens and Tim Hudson had the best strikeout to walk ratio? If you answered Derek Lowe, it was probably because this is his section, not because you legitimately would have thought that. Derek Lowe has been maligned (possibly fairly) because of his contract, to such an extent that I think he's actually pretty underrated at this point, especially by Braves fans. Few people would guess that Lowe really pitched about as well as Hudson did last year. The only major difference between the two pitchers was Hudson's unbelievably low .253 BABIP v. Lowe's substantially higher than should be expected .313. They were virtually identical in strikeouts, walks, HR's allowed, 2B's allowed, which are generally the categories that pitchers can control. Pitchers typically can't control whether or not a given single type hit gets caught or turns into an out. Last year Lowe was pretty bad at what I call "magic pitching" which basically means he was slightly unlucky. I expect a solid season out of him.

Tim Hudson - 3.60 ERA 15-8 145 K's 72 BB's 15 HR's allowed 194 IP

As mentioned above, if Lowe was slightly unlucky, Hudson was extremely lucky. That's not to say he wasn't a good pitcher last year, just that his record and ERA indicated a GREAT pitcher, which he probably wasn't. The argument that he's a ground ball pitcher really doesn't hold water, as so was Lowe and both gave up nearly identical 2B and HR rates. I expect a return to Earth for Hudson this year, though I still expect him to put up solid numbers. Just not the spectacular numbers of last year.

Tommy Hanson - 3.02 ERA 16-7 190 K's 65 BB's 14 HR's allowed 196 IP

Tommy Hanson was INCREDIBLY unlucky last year, especially when it came to wins and losses and run support. Sure, he was prone to the occasional disaster game, but he was much more "prone" to a gem where he took a ND or loss due to lack of run support. Last year, he dropped somewhat in strikeouts, but also cut his walks, making it a wash. Hanson should still be in the progression stage of his career and my projections reflect that. I fully expect by the second half of this year that he will be considered the staff ace.

Jair Jurrjens - 4.05 ERA 10-10 120 K's 60 BB's 17 HR's allowed 170 IP

Well, I'll more than likely get a lot of hate for this. Who is Jair Jurrjens? Is he the guy that threw up some upper echelon stats in 2009, the slightly above average guy from 2008, the 3rd or 4th starter prospect from his Detroit days or the awful pitcher with injury issues from last year? The truth is he's probably some of all of that. Jair walks a decent amount of people, doesn't strike a whole lot of guys out and gives up a decent amount of doubles and HR's. Those things are all bad. However, he does tend to get a pretty decent amount of GIDP's and pitches well from the stretch. He had a slightly higher than expected BABIP allowed last year at .309, so he probably won't be quite as bad as he was last year, but he'll likely be a 4th starter type pitcher who gives you a chance to win many of the games he pitches. Also disconcerting was a fastball that mostly sat in the 85-89 range in spring training, a 1-3 MPH dropoff on an already average fastball, if that kind of velocity drop is here to stay, things could get ugly. Do not expect the greatness that most Braves fans expected from Jurrjens going forward. Definitely don't expect a 2009 type year from him.

Brandon Beachy - 4.10 ERA 6-5 80 K's 28 BB's 8 HR's allowed 85 IP

Beachy v. Minor was a pretty big battle this spring, but it boiled down to a LOT of factors. 1) Beachy did in fact pitch slightly better than Minor this spring, though both pitched very well. 2) The Braves seem to view Minor as the better long term prospect, and thus likely want him to get regular work in AAA, especially during the early part of the season, when the 5th starter gets skipped a lot and 3) Playing each other back and forth between the minors delays both players service clocks, to the Braves largest financial advantage 4) If the Braves trade Beacy this year, they'd prefer to get him as much MLB exposure as possible. If both pitchers pitch in the 5th spot for roughly half the year, as I expect if neither is traded, then the Braves get two players for cheaper, longer. I'd really look for Beachy to get traded though, as good as he's looked, he has no long term future in Atlanta, with Teheran and Delgado on their way, Mike Minor and Tommy Hanson already here and any other number of pitching prospects not all that far behind either. Best case scenario is he pitches lights out for a couple months, gets packaged for a SS to someone in need of a SP (who doesn't need SP?) and Minor takes over.

Mike Minor - 4.05 ERA 6-5 90 K's 33 BB's 9 HR's allowed 90 IP

I believe that being lefty and the better long term prospect, Minor pitches more than Beachy, and perhaps much more if Beachy is traded, even though Beachy got the initial nod at #5. I think Minor is a solid #3/#4 long term for the franchise, and in many rotations could perhaps be a solid #2. He'll long term be behind Hanson and Teheran and maybe even Delgado in a future Braves rotation. But this is a column about this year and I expect him to put up good, though not world beating, numbers this year. His IP numbers could be substantially higher if there is a significant injury to anyone on the Braves staff, or if Beachy is traded, but I don't predict those kinds of things here.

Kenshin Kawakami will only see a Braves rotation if hellfire and brimstone rain down on the Braves starters and Teheran is absolutely not ready. Hopefully he's traded for some sort of contract relief, but likely he just makes $6.67 million to be the Gwinnett Braves' #2 starter (or as recent reports are saying the AA Mississippi team). For the record, I don't know that he's all that terrible, but it's clear he has no future in the Braves' rotation, despite his paycheck.

Overall I expect the rotation to be good, just not as good as some of those saying they believe it rivals the Phillies rotation seem to believe. The Braves may well be a better team than the Phillies overall, but let's be 100% clear. This rotation is not even remotely close to what the Phillies will be throwing out there, barring injuries. Don't expect the same 3rd in MLB ERA as last year either.

Bullpen:

The 2011 Braves' bullpen is shaping up to be one of the more interesting stories around MLB. Mostly because the team seems set to at least initially go with a situational closer system, not quite closer by committee, but it will probably be referred to by that moniker. I went in depth as to why I think it will probably work in a previous posting here, so I won't really go into the ins and outs of why I think this situation is different than most of the other failed closer systems. The bullpen has the arms to be a really special unit, but also has the potential to really implode if things don't go right, as will be addressed in my biggest fears column.

Craig Kimbrell (RHP) - Closer
Jonny Venters (LHP) - Closer
Peter Moylan (RHP)
Eric O'Flaherty (LHP)
Scott Linebrink (RHP)
George Sherrill (LHP)
Christhian Martinez (RHP)

Craig Kimbrell - 3.87 ERA 55 IP 78 K's 35 Walks 17 Saves

I don't think that Kimbrell has fully solved his wildness and I believe he'll go through at least a couple of situations in which he really blows a couple of games. I'd almost be more inclined to put him in a one run game than a 3 run lead, as he can absolutely dominate at times, but can also completely blow ordinarily safe leads. He may well have the most unhittable stuff in all of baseball, but he often has no idea where his slider is going. At any given time he could quite easily walk two and give up a 3 run homer or strikeout the side in order. I would have rather seen him have one year of MLB experience in low leverage situations before being thrust into the closer role, but such is life. I believe long term he will be one of the most dominant closers in the game, I just don't think he will be this year, this year I think he'll be good overall, with streaks of horridness and elite greatness.

Jonny Venters - 2.34 ERA 65 IP 70K's 26 Walks 23 Saves

You could make the case that Jonny Venters was the most valuable reliever in the NL last year. He devastated the league with not only more K's than innings pitched, but also one of the highest ground ball percentages in MLB history for relievers throwing as many innings as he did. All his pitches have strong downward movement and he throws hard. However, he was wild at times last year, giving up around a half a walk per IP, which isn't particularly good. What happens in year 2 is a mystery. He doesn't seem to be a flash in the pan, as he threw too many innings and had too good of stuff to be merely a statistical anomaly, as a lot of relievers are at times. Yet, he did seem to get off lightly when he was wild last year, and perhaps he may have a few more blowup games than he did last year. However you can also make the case that relievers tend to get less wild with experience, and such may be the case with Venters. I think he'll be the better closer this year out of he and Kimbrell, though I think long term Kimbrell is better. I don't think his numbers will be quite as good as last year, but I also wouldn't be surprised if they're better. I think Venters will again pitch a ton, as both a closer and a situational lefty. He will most likely be the Braves' most valuable reliever.

Peter Moylan - 3.45 ERA 64 IP 55 K's 26 Walks

Moylan changed his delivery towards the end of last year to become even more of a sidearmer, to great effect. He has shown control problems in the past. However, the downward movement he gets on his pitches is absurd. As Peter Hjort of Capitol Avenue Club put it, "his changeup is a sinker, his sinker is a super-sinker and his curve is a changeup." This movement is why he gets so many ground balls, why he strikes out a decent number despite not particularly great velocity and why he walks a relatively high number of batters. Expect him to be the primary situational righty and ground ball double play specialist.

Eric O'Flaherty - 3.67 ERA 60 IP 45 K's 24 Walks

O'Flaherty will be the second lefty in the pen after Venters, and the primary lefty in games in which it's near certain that Venters will close. Despite being not as well known as the above three guys, he will play an important role out of the bullpen this year. Expect to see a lot more of him, as situations in which Venters would ordinarily be called upon last year, will likely go to O'Flaherty this year, as Venters is often saved for the 9th inning. How will the young guy with a mixed track record handle the increased pressure situations?

Scott Linebrink - 3.85 ERA 50 IP 45 K's 17 Walks

I think he'll get a nice boost in his numbers from switching leagues and going from ultra hitter friendly U.S. Cellular Field to Turner Field. Many hitters won't have much experience with him and we should see his atrocious number of homeruns drop to a merely bad level. That's the thing with Linebrink, he has good control and puts up decent strikeout numbers, but will give up homeruns. As long as you give him "clean frames" where the worst he can do is give up a solo shot, he is fine. However, if you bring him in with men on base a lot, expect to give up some multi-run bombs.

George Sherrill - 3.50 ERA 35 IP 34 K's 17 Walks

His role will be that of a purely situational lefty when the team doesn't want to burn Venters or O'Flaherty. In that role he will be fine. He is eaten alive by RH batters, but can still get lefties out. Mediocre to bad control at this stage in his career. Will likely frustrate a lot of Braves fans with the following type lines : 0 IP, 1BB, 1 batter faced. But he may also save a lot of jams when the likes of Ryan Howard comes to the plate with men on 2nd and 3rd with two outs in the 6th inning.

Christhian Martinez - 4.00 ERA 32 IP 26 K's 9 Walks

For some reason a lot of people think that Martinez is a high strikeout high walks guy. Which points out two things: 1) People don't know much about him and 2) He's really the Braves only reliever with what can be called excellent control. He has shown elite control with an acceptable K rate throughout the minors and in the majors. Expect him to be the primary long man. People also tend to think he's a young guy. He's 29 years old. He's about at his ceiling, and I expect Stephen Marek and/or Kris Medlen to take his spot at some point in time this year. Which may or may not be a shame, because I think he's more useful than people think, especially considering how wild the rest of the bullpen can be.

Overall, the thing that worries me most about this bullpen is wildness. All of the primary guys are prone to extended bouts of wildness, with Kimbrell being the poster child. If this group can hold the walks down, they have the collective stuff to be completely dominant. However, I'm betting than a few "games in hand" get blown due to walks. On the other hand, I'd be willing to bet they will also go through streaks where a one run lead stands up for several innings as strikeout after strikeout is piled up.

Sources: Baseball-reference.com, Maple Street Press 2011 Braves Guide, Bill James Handbook 2011, Atlanta Journal Constitution Braves beat blog (David O'Brien, Carrol Rodgers), Paul Lebowitz's 2011 Baseball Guide, MLB.com, Capitol Avenue Club

Part 1: In Depth Predictions For the 2011 Atlanta Braves (Coaches, lineup regulars and bench)

Part 2: Pitching and Bullpen
Part 3: Defense and overall predictions


Now that all but a couple of mostly inconsequential bench and back of the bullpen spots have been settled, I am offering up my exhaustive 2011 Atlanta Braves preview.

Managers & Coaches
# Name Position
33 Fredi Gonzalez Manager
25 Larry Parrish Batting Coach
45 Roger McDowell Pitching Coach
9 Terry Pendleton First Base Coach
51 Brian Snitker Third Base Coach
18 Carlos Tosca Bench Coach
12 Eddie Perez Bullpen Coach
55 Alan Butts Coach

While not having Six (Bobby Cox) around is very much a culture shock, I don't think it will be a major difference for the club. Fredi Gonzalez is a Bobby Cox disciple, is very familiar with many of the players, either because they were on the Braves when Fredi was a coach in Atlanta, or Fredi managed them in Florida or just from the large number of games the Braves played against Gonzalez's Marlins. Fredi's tendencies in Florida were overall very similar to Bobby's managerial tendencies, for better and worse. Fredi may perhaps be slightly less inclined to burn his trusted relievers out and may have a slightly quicker hook on certain starting pitchers than Bobby did, which may perhaps mean the back of the bullpen sees more action than it did under Bobby, when several relievers could go weeks or months without seeing any real action. Gonzalez has put a renewed emphasis on stretching and defensive drills in spring training. Whether that will be of consequence is hard to say. Fredi seems much more likely to put out a tradional "Joe Morgan" lineup order, whereas as old and as set in his ways Bobby may have been, he would experiment with more "modern" approaches to lineup construction. This will be revisited at length later.

Who knows what we will have with Larry Parrish as a hitting instructor. It was a slightly odd choice, but who knows if he will be an improvement or not from Terry Pendleton, where it seemed like very few hitters took Terry's advice or grew as hitters very much. No use in speculating here.

Roger McDowell is back and I'm okay with the job he's done overall, though not completely in love with it either. He's perhaps gotten more out of Jair Jurjjens than you'd expect, how he handles the young pitchers that Atlanta will see this year and over the next few years will be the major test of his mettle.

Overall I'm very satisfied with the job Frank Wren has done. I loved the Uggla trade, but was ambivalent over the Uggla extension. I'd like to see the organization spend more money on the draft and international players, but it's hard to tell if that's Frank's choice or the mandate of Liberty Media, who may not want to spend a ton of money on the draft when they may be trying to sell the franchise. Spending money on the draft may be smart for the franchise long term, but it doesn't do much to raise its value when up for sale, as the Braves may or may not be. The farm system is loaded pitching wise and he could have a lot of ammo to make an impact trade this year if he so desired. If Wren so desired, he could trade for pretty much any player in MLB that would be available, and perhaps quite a few that aren't really considered available. He could also sit on the arms and see what kind of rotation will emerge of them over the next few years (what I'd mostly favor). Putting Beachy in the starting rotation to start this year was a shrewd move on Wren's part, as will be discussed later.

Let's be honest, the rest of the staff is of little practical consequence. They do their jobs and don't have much impact on the team.

Starting Lineup (in probable batting order):
Martin Prado - LF
Nate McLouth - CF
Chipper Jones - 3B
Dan Uggla - 2B
Brian McCann - C
Jason Heyward - RF
Alex Gonzalez - SS
Freddie Freeman - 1B

Let me start by saying lineup order doesn't matter much. Fans tend to freak out over it, but it's really not a big deal. That being said I HATE the way it seems that Fredi is going to order his lineup. Your best hitter CANNOT hit sixth. That just can't happen. If you were to design the perfect number two hitter, he would have a high OBP, run the bases extremely well but not really be a major base stealer (distracts the #3 hitter and runs into outs in front of power hitters), he would have good power and hit a lot of doubles and he would work pitchers. He would be Jason Heyward. Bobby nailed it out of the park by batting Heyward 2nd last year, and it really pains me to see Fredi take such a huge step backwards. Not only is Fredi robbing Heyward of nearly 5 games worth of at bats over the course of a season, he's also giving somebody who will probably be on base around 40% of the time the opportunity to be knocked in by Alex Gonzalez, Freddie Freeman and the pitcher. As opposed to Chipper Jones, Dan Uggla and Brian McCann. Just ugh.

Perhaps worse is the fact that it seems that even if Nate McClouth doesn't work out in the #2 spot, Fredi's next move seems to be to put Alex Gonzalez in the #2 spot. Sea Bass, as he is semi-affectionately known, was Fredi's most common hitter in the #2 spot in spring, even ahead of the person who will likely start the season there, Nate McClouth. While Jason Heyward is pretty much what you would draw up for a #2 hitter, Alex Gonzalez is the exact opposite. He is a free swinger, is a mediocre base runner, swings for the fences and doesn't work counts. He's not even good at fundamental old school #2 type hitter stuff, like hitting behind the runner. But he plays SS and is a veteran, and under the Joe Morgan book on lineup construction, that means something.

The rest of the lineup order is pretty much paint by the numbers and doesn't really need to be talked about.

Hitter Projections: All averages are of the form: (batting average/on base percentage/slugging percentage)

Brian McCann - (.287/.380/.500) 27 HR 97 RBI 73 Runs 39 2B

I expect a nice bounce back year from McCann, courtesy of finally seeming to have his vision issues straightened out and despite seeing a drop in power numbers, he saw an increase in his walk rate. The power projections might be on the high side, as it is difficult to tell if last year was just an aberration power wise or if he is losing some power due to premature aging from catching. I'd tend to vote for the aberration side and my projections reflect that belief. If he hits those numbers, I think he'll be again recognized as rivaling Mauer as the best hitting catcher in the game.

Freddie Freeman - (.270/.335/.450) 16 HR 70 RBI 55 Runs 36 2B

The young buck will have his ups and downs, but I think over the long haul will more than hold his own. He's aggressive at the plate, but doesn't swing at bad pitches. He could walk a touch more than he does, but his plate discipline is acceptable. Long term I think he projects as a prototypical #6 hitter, and hopefully he ends up there by the end of the year this year.

Dan Uggla - (.272/.360/.510) 36 HR 120 RBI 100 Runs 35 2B

I expect Uggla to have a huge year. I don't think last year's batting average and OBP improvements were complete flukes. Now he'll be hitting in a slightly friendlier stadium in a substantially better lineup.

Chipper Jones (.305/.415/.510) 140 games played (the most important stat) 25 HR 95 RBI 98 Runs 35 2B

I expect an excellent year from Chipper, but with a few nagging injuries here and there. Who really knows what you'll get games played wise. He's looked extraordinary in spring, just hitting a 450 foot homer to dead center right handed, as I type this. How that plays out is really anybody's guess.

Alex Gonzalez (.236/.279/.386) 12 HR 70 RBI 55 Runs 25 2B

Ugh, just ugh. He's going to continue to regress at the plate. His numbers after leaving super hitter friendly Rogers Center and coming to pitcher friendly Turner Field were ugly and I expect it to get even uglier. I don't know when the Braves are going to address the SS position, as it seems like Lipka is a ways away in the minors, Salcedo is a ways away and projects as a 3B to my eyes. Hicks projects as a utility infielder, best case scenario. I wouldn't be totally upset if the Braves used a tiny bit of their minor league pitching depth on this position. Yes, I hated Yunel Escobar too, but man, it's hard to like Gonzalez.

Jason Heyward (.305/.440/.560) 28 HR 98 RBI 95 Runs 43 2B 14 steals

Health is an issue, as he seems to be semi-prone to nagging injuries at times. What isn't an issue is talent, as he is perhaps the most talented Brave since Hank Aaron. He'll be walked a TON as long as Alex Gonzalez and Freddie Freeman are hitting behind him, as he will begin to really strike fear into opposing pitchers. He will smartly not change his approach, still forcing pitchers to make pitches to him or walk him. This is smart, you take a walk, even in the #6 spot if the pitcher isn't really pitching to you. He will be on base so much that he will have nearly 100 runs out of the number 6 spot, which is virtually unheard of in the National League. Fredi's plan to have him in the #6 spot to drive in runs will be undermined by the amount he's walked, negating the already dubious reasoning for putting him there in the first place. It's sad that a possible MVP candidate will have his impact hurt this much by a stupid batting order decision. Hopefully the amount he's walked will eventually put him in the #2 spot, where he belongs.

(let me say that I don't think lineup protection is important value wise, but in very few cases, I think it can matter just in what types of outcomes you get. Taking a walk is really valuable, regardless of your position in the lineup, so I don't think lineup protection will make a player a better or worse hitter. However, I think it can effect walk rates in extreme cases. As going from hitting in front of Chipper, Uggla, McCann to Gonzalez, Freeman, pitcher is about as extreme of a situation as you'll find)

Nate McLouth (.260/.350/.420) 15 HR 100 Runs 58 RBI 30 2B 22 steals

We've seen a lot of "bad Nate" and people are hoping for a return to "good Nate", what we'll probably see is "mediocre Nate." He has some pop, some speed and walks a decent amount. He's really not made to be a #2 hitter, as his contact rate, even at it's best isn't what you want out of a #2 guy, he's not patient enough for a #2 guy. But he'll be okay in the spot I believe. He's substantially better than the other option that Fredi seems inclined to put there, Sea Bass.

Martin Prado (.305/.368/.470) 17 HR 115 runs 60 RBI 42 2B

Martin Prado is one of the few players that you can routinely bet on beating most of the mathematical projection type systems on a regular basis. The guy just works that hard that he's going to beat a normal career advancement curve. He should have a little more "juice in the tank" from playing the less physically taxing position of left field, which could translate into a very mild bump offensively. Then you take into account his natural progression and I think he could make another big jump in his offensive numbers. I wouldn't be totally shocked if he hit 30 HRs by turning a lot of those long doubles he hits into HRs, as he's definitely strong enough. He'll be hitting leadoff, which I think is good for him, because his one weakness is an occasional lack of patience. Hitting leadoff, he will be more inclined to be patient, and pitchers may be more inclined to throw him strikes.

Bench:

I am not going to give bench projections, as they're essentially impossible to predict, because A) how many AB's they get mostly depends on impossible to predict injuries B) their stats are over such a small sample size that they may as well be meaningless. I will just talk about what it is that each of the bench candidates brings to the table and under what circumstances they will play. First I'll address the three virtual locks for a bench job, and then talk about the remaining players who will either start the season on the bench or be likely to be on the bench at some point in time.

Brooks Conrad has some pop and switch hits. He's a fine candidate for a late inning pinch hitter position and very occasional sub. Last year, due to a myriad of injuries, Conrad was forced to play in the field a lot. For a lot of the year he held himself up admirably, despite being far from his forte and why he was on the team. But he was eventually exposed in an awful way. He is a defensive liability, there is no way around that objective fact. However, he will be fine as long as he's not counted on to give a substantial number of innings in the field. If a situation comes up where he will be counted on in that manner, Frank Wren should immediately make a move, as he just can't be out in the field for any significant number of innings.

Eric Hinske is a prototypical pinch hitter and occasional sub. He's going to give you good late inning left handed ABs with some pop. He hits the ball relatively hard and doesn't get himself out a whole lot, which is about all you can ask of a pinch hitter. He'll give you some occasional games at 1B and LF.

David Ross is, for my money, the best backup catcher in the NL. A defensive wizard, he's also perfectly adequate in the batter's box as well. This is very important because of how much the Braves depend on McCann's offense. A huge drop off would drastically change the way the team played on days when McCann was off. However, with Ross, while there is a decline, it's not drastic and allows the team to more or less function normally.

Brandon Hicks seems to have come on strong lately. He's primarily a SS/3B. He's good defensively, at least he has been in the minors, though I'd say he's short of being a "wizard." He's always had good power and speed, and he's shown increased discipline and contact rate in a limited sample size this spring. He is an excellent baserunner and was Bobby's primary pinch runner last year after he was called up. He hits RH, which is a plus since Hinske is LH and Conrad is a switch hitter. He's not a candidate to play regularly if an injury occurs, however.

Matt Young is a speedy guy who can play all the OF positions and is perhaps the best player not already assigned to the minors to play CF. He's likely a defensive OF solely. Gives the Braves 2 strong pinch runner, should the need arise. Will be mostly used in late game defensive sub situations, especially in any games where Hinske plays LF. He makes more sense when you consider that Chipper will likely get a lot of days off, where Prado will likely slide back to 3B and have Matt play CF or LF late in the game in defensive situations for Hinske, with McClouth playing the other spot.


Players who, despite being assigned to the minors will likely see substantial time in Atlanta at some point:

Diory Hernandez is a solid fielder and marginal hitter. He probably should have been in the field during some of those late year Brooks Conrad defensive lapses. I believe that if a middle infielder goes on the DL at some point this year Diory would be called up and would start over Hicks, Lucas or Mather.

Jordan Schafer is an interesting tale. He lost almost all of 2010 due to injury, has been suspended for something to do with HGH (never exactly clear what went on) and has struggled this spring, despite "looking good and feeling great." I think the Braves, much like Wilkin Ramirez, are sending Schafer to minors, because they still believe he has a future in Atlanta. After having missed so much time, they believe that he mostly needs regular ABs, which he wouldn't get in a bench role in Atlanta. If he hits well in the minors, I expect him to be the first one called up if someone goes on the DL at 3B, CF or RF. 3B may seem weird, until you consider that Prado would probably vacate LF and slide into 3B if/when Chipper goes on the DL. In that scenario I believe you'd see Nate slide over into LF (or perhaps Hinske) and Schafer take CF. If Jordan doesn't hit well in the minors, I'd expect Wilkin Ramirez to get called up and some sort of combination of all the available options to fill the role Schafer would. I personally believe he's too talented and too hard of a worker to not eventually get things turned around, though he is quickly running out of time.

Next up: Starters and Bullpen (article now posted: Link here )
After that: team defensive performance, overall record predictions, awards, etc
After that: Top 10 fears for the 2011 Atlanta Braves

Sources: Baseball-reference.com, Maple Street Press 2011 Braves Guide, Bill James Handbook 2011, Atlanta Journal Constitution Braves beat blog (David O'Brien, Carrol Rodgers), Paul Lebowitz's 2011 Baseball Guide, MLB.com, Capitol Avenue Club